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Ellerin v. Fairfax
Savings, F.S.B.:
ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE OF A
MISREPRESENTATION, COUPLED
WITH AN INTENT
TO DECEIVE
THEREBY, SATISFIES
THE ACTUAL
MALICE
REQUIREMENT
FOR ANA WARD
OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES IN
A TORT ACTION
OF FRAUD.

In an opinion that gave
an extensive review of fraud
. and the concept ofpunitive damages, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland determined the appropriate standard for an award
of punitive damages in a tort
action of fraud. In Ellerin v.
Fairfax Savings, PSB., 337
Md. 216,652A.2d 1117 (1995),
the court of appeals held that a
person's actual knowledge of
falsity, coupled with an intent
to deceive by way of the falsehood, established the actual
malice required for the availability of punitive damages in
an action of fraud.
Charles Ellerin and
Louis Seidel ("Ellerin") financed a commercial real estate development through
Fairfax Savings, F. S.B.
("Fairfax"). In order to secure
its loan, Fairfax required Ellerin
to personally guarantee the
project. It was undisputed that
the final guarantees signed at
the settlement were different
from earlier drafts approved by
Ellerin. Although Ellerin would
not have been liable under the
approved drafts, he was liable,
after subsequent default, under
the guarantees signed at settlement. Fairfax's attorneys insisted that the addition of extended liability, to the final guarantees, was unintentional.
Fairfax filed suit in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore
County for repayment of the
loan. Ellerin counterclaimed,
asserting that Fairfax had fraudulently changed the guarantees.
The jury found Fairfax's actions fraudulent. However, the

jury also found that Ellerin ratified the fraud by continued performance. As such, summary
judgment was granted in favor
of Fairfax. The court of special
appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Ellerin's continued performance did not preclude him from damages based
on fraud. The second trial ended in a hung jury. At the third
trial, the only inquiry concerning fraud was Ellerin's knowledge, at the signing, of changes
made to the guarantees. The
trial court held that, as a matter
of law, Ellerin had ratified the
guarantees and was liable.
In the damages phase,
undertaken to ascertain
Fairfax's liability in the fraud
action, the jury awarded both
compensatory and punitive
damages. The trial court denied Fairfax's requestto instruct
the jury with respect to the malice necessary for punitive damages, since, in the court's view,
actual malice was inherent in
the elements of fraud. Fairfax
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland which
affirmed the compensatory
damages, but vacated the punitive damages award. The intermediate appellate court held that
the jury should have been instructed as to the element of
malice necessary to support an
award of punitive damages, and
ordered a new trial. Fairfax's
petition for a writ of certiorari,
concerning its liability for compensatory damages, was denied
by the court ofappeals. Ellerin's
petition for a writ of certiorari,
challenging the new trial on pu-

-- --.---.-.----.------ ------_ 25.3 / U. Bali:. L.r. -

~

nitive damages, was granted.
Beginning its analysis,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland reviewed the justification
for the imposition of punitive
damages, that is, to "punish and
deter" the actions of a wrongdoer. The court highlighted the
character of the defendant's
conduct as the determining factor for the imposition of punitive damages. Citing the standard for punitive damages in
non-intentional tort cases, the
court held that the conduct of
the defendant will be deemed
sufficiently heinous when
"characterized by evil motive,
intent to injure, ill will, or fraud,
i. e. 'actual malice. '" Ellerin,
337 Md at 229, 652 A.2d at
1123 (quoting Owens-Illinios
v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 460,
601 A.2d 633, 652 (1992)).
Analyzing the tort of
fraud, as related to the punitive
damages requirement of actual
malice, the court emphasized
the elements of intent and
knowledge. In an action for
fraud, the defendant must have
knowledge of the falsity and a
"deliberate intent to deceive"
based on the falsehood. Id at
230, 652 A.2d at 1124. The
knowledge element of fraud,
that the falsehood was actually
known or that the defendant
offered the misrepresentation
with reckless indifference as to
its truth, was clarified by the
court. Id at 232, 652 A.2d at
1124. As the court explained, a
defendant will be "liable in a
tort action of fraud only if he
knows the misrepresentation
was false or was recklessly in-

different in the sense that he
knows he lacks knowledge as
to its truth or falsity." Id at232,
652 A.2d at 1125.
Considering that punitive damages must be based on
a defendant's conscious wrongdoing, the court qualified the
knowledge element of fraud
with respect to punitive damages. The court held thataIthough
the defendant's reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of a
representation satisfies the
knowledge element of fraud, it
does not meet the mens rea standard of actual knowledge required for an award of punitive
damages. Id at 235, 652 A.2d
at 1126. However, the court
held that fraud, committed by a
defendant who knows his representation is false, equates to
the "deliberate wrongdoing and
evil motive" that justifies the
award of punitive damages. Id.
Therefore, the basis for punitive damages, in an action of
fraud, is actual knowledge of
the falsity ofthe representation,
coupled with an intent to use
such a falsehood to deceive. Id
at 240, 652 A.2d at 1129. Such
a finding of actual knowledge,
as opposed to reckless indifference, satisfies the actual malice
requirement for an award ofpunitive damages. Id
The court vacated the
award of punitive damages and
ordered a new trial concerning
such damages. Id. at 241, 652
A.2d at 1129. The court required that the jury be instructed as to the elements of fraud,
and that the trial court note the
actual knowledge and reckless
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indifference distinction central
to the Ellerin decision. Id
In dicta, the court also
provided the trial court some
"guidance" as to the issue of
excessive punitive damages.
The court stated that, upon request, the jury should be instructed that the amount of punitive damages should not be
disproportionate to the wrongfulness of the conduct or the
ability of the defendant to pay.
Id at 242,652 A.2d at 1130. In
a final footnote, the court analogized the amount of punitive
damages to maximum criminal
fines, stating that the trial court
"may consider the legislative
policy reflected" in such statutes. Id at 242 n.13, 652 A.2d
at 1130.
Although he concurred
with the majority's opinion, regarding the necessity of actual
malice in a fraud action, Judge
Bell dissented as to the distinction between actual knowledge
and reckless indifference. Id at
244,652 A.2d at 1130 (Bell, J.,
dissenting). He reasoned that
the requisite mental state necessary for punitive damages is
inherent in the elements offraud,
and, as such, the distinction
outlined by the court is unnecessary. Id Judge Bell also
questioned the propriety of the
majority's analogy, to criminal
fines, as adding unnecessary
confusion to the jury instructions. Id at 247, 652 A.2d at
1132.
In drawing a distinction
between the two knowledge elements offraud, and the requisite mens rea for an award of
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punitive damages, Ellerin v.
Fairfax, clarifies the relationship between two seemingly
settled areas of law. The law,
its elements, and the standards
by which it is measured, are in
constant need ofrefinement and
interpretation. However,
whereas the standard for puni ti ve damages in a fraud action is more focused, the value

Jessica G. v. Hector M.:

MOTHER'S
UNSUCCESSFUL
PATERNITY ACTION
DOES NOT
BAR CHILD'S
SUBSEQUENT
PATERNITY ACTION.

of the court's dicta, on excessive punitive damages, is unknown. The lack of an authoritative judicial decision may further confuse the issue. Adding
another variable to the equation
does not solve the problem.
However, consideration oflegislative policy may lay the foundation for an effective judicial
tool regarding the reasonable-

ness of punitive damages
awards.
Nevertheless, given the
precarious political climate, at
the state and national level, concerning tort reform and punitive damages, it is encouraging
that the issue of excessive punitive damages has entered the
judicial discussion.
- Terrence J Daly

In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a paternity
action brought by a mother, then
dismissed with prejudice, does
not necessarily bar a subsequent
paternity action brought by the
child. Of even more importance, the court's ruling inJessica G. v. Hector M, 337 Md.
388, 653 A.2d 922 (1995)
broadly construed Family Law
Code, section 5-1038(b), to allow the modification or setting
aside of all paternity orders except declarations of paternity.
Thus, even an order terminating litigation, such as a dismissal with prejudice, can be
set aside and the paternity issue
relitigated by the child's subsequent paternity action.
In March 1985, Joyce
G. and Hector M. had an intimate relationship. In December of that same year, Joyce
gave birth to Jessica G. Soon
after Jessica's birth, Joyce filed
a paternity action against Hector in the Circuit Court for
Harford County. Blood tests of
the three parties indicated that
there was a 99.97% chance that

Hector was Jessica's father.
Nonetheless, Hector refused to
admit paternity. Aftertwoyears
of prolonged discovery, Joyce
asked to stop the paternity action. A consent order to dismiss the action with prejudice
was drafted and signed by all
parties but Joyce. When the
Assistant State's Attorney explained the meaning of with
prejudice, Joyce refused to sign
the order. However, in March
1988, the State's Attorney docketed the consent order.
Joyce tried repeatedly
to continue the paternity action.
She filed another paternity suit
in the Family Court of New
York. The New York court
dismissed the action, relying
solely on the 1988 Harford
County dismissal with prejudice. While Joyce was pursuing various avenues of appeal,
Jessica filed a paternity action
against Hector in the Circuit
Court for Harford County.
Hectorresponded by filing a motion to dismiss Jessica's action based on the doctrineofresjudicata. Thecircuit
court found that Joyce was rep-

